I will forever be indebted to you for your efforts to popularize cognitive empathy, which has become the central organizing principle of my own efforts in U.S.-China policy. For years, I simply called it “informed empathy” to differentiate it from the more common (but equally important) emotional empathy with which we all (mostly) come equipped. Thanks, Bob!
Kaiser, thanks for checking in here--your presence bumps our comments section up a notch on the prestige scale! And I'm delighted and flattered to hear that my ideas have been of service to you--you're definitely fighting the good fight.
"My claim [is] that more robust and widely deployed cognitive empathy could transform US foreign policy"
No, no, no. While cognitive empathy has certainly made you a perceptive and humane critic of American foreign policy, it would mainly have the effect of getting whichever policymakers adopted it fired. The goals of policy are determined by the interests of any society's dominant groups. They are not subject to change except through large changes in structure and distribution of power in that society. The overriding goal of American policy in the Middle East for 80+ years is to keep effective control of oil -- not total control, necessarily, but certainty that significant energy resources would not be controlled by states that would either use oil revenues to construct a society and economy independent of the American world system or, even worse, use them as a geopolitical weapon (just as we would do if ever challenged). I suspect most American policymakers know about the ugly history of American intervention in Iran and elsewhere and the Middle East, and it makes no difference whatever -- except perhaps tonally and tactically. Well-informed policymakers would use their deeper appreciation of history to devise more effective ways to crush their geopolitical antagonists -- because they have to. If they were to refuse, they would wind up writing an excellent, enlightened newsletter, to which no one in power would pay the slightest attention.
RE: ' a challenging claim to corroborate even in longer form.'. Barbara Tuchman, better known for The Guns of August about WWI, made headway in her 1998 book The March of Folly from Troy to Vietnam. She showed how arrogance and prestige, together with the inability or refusal to understand the motivations, resources, and determined will of the other side, led repeatedly to the sacrifice of lives and moral for no morally justifiable or even politcally rational ends.
I read the McCrystal-French conversation. I thought the General's views were compelling and enlightening but I missed the pushback from French. Thank you for pointing that out.
I've long felt Wright has been correct about our egging on Russia to protect itself by invading Ukraine, a point Mearsheimer got a lot of flack for from the Blob. But following that analogy, Israel would be Russia in that correlation. Iran has aggressively targeted Israel through proxies as well as rhetoric for many decades, making Israel feel as cornered as Russia, if not more so. I hate the settlement atrocity that gives lie to the supposed seriousness that Israel has given the two state solution, but I can't blame Israel for wanting to defang Iran considering Iran's practically open warfare for much of Israel existance. Double standard here, Bob?
I found this exchange both thoughtful and necessary. As a career Special Operations Forces soldier, I share the perspective General McChrystal expresses. Those of us who have spent our lives in the profession of arms are often the last people eager to see war. We understand its consequences not as abstractions but as memories - friends lost, families shattered, and the quiet weight carried by those who return home. Soldiers know that strategy requires more than strength; it requires the discipline to understand how our adversaries see the world and why conflicts begin in the first place. General McChrystal’s willingness to acknowledge the deeper historical context behind Iranian hostility reflects the kind of strategic empathy that serious military leaders must cultivate.
What struck me most in the article is that the most balanced voice in the conversation came from the man who had commanded troops in war. That is not an accident. Those who have paid the price of war tend to approach it with humility and caution. We do not romanticize it, and we do not treat it as a political talking point. Instead, we seek to understand the chain of decisions, grievances, and miscalculations that bring nations into conflict. If more of our national debate reflected the kind of perspective McChrystal demonstrated - grounded in history, strategic awareness, and empathy for how others perceive our actions - we might avoid some of the needless wars that have marked our recent history.
A great essay from Bob! I was so startled by McCrystal's informed and thoughtful view of U.S.-Iranian history and the lessons it can teach us that I didn't pay attention to French's comments as much as I should have. I forwarded French's interview to several friends, but recommended it only on the basis of McCrystal's surprising narrative. Thanks! I will share this valuable commentary also.
I am totally on board with your views on cognitive empathy. It is a shame that so many people, including some of your commenters, do not understand that cognitive empathy is way different from affective (emotional) empathy. My last post is about the different types of empathy.
No one can know exactly how another person, or group of people, feels though it is not too difficult, with a little effort, to attain a pretty good understand of what is going on in someone else's head. And this insight can be extremely useful when deciding how best to deal with this other person/group. This is true for international relations as well as dealing with a rebellious teenager. Having a good idea what an opposing leader, or a teenager, wants, as well as what pisses them off, opens up a lot more options than just trying to bludgeon them into submission.
Bob, it sound like you may be conflating how wars are sold to voters with how leaders arrive at the decision to go to war. Cognitive empathy (or rather lack thereof) is very relevant to the former, to how we might think about the wars our countries wage, but not so much to the latter. Leaders may well evince a lack of understanding of their adversaries, but I doubt that this is due to some kind of a ill-conceived animus or a lack of empathy. rather they may be prone to over-estimating their hand or miscalculate the enemy's response. For instance on Iraq, RAND’s review of postwar planning found that optimistic assumptions at senior levels overrode warnings about what would follow the invasion. That looks much more like misjudgment and overconfidence than like a simple empathy failure. And this time, where is the evidence that Trump and Netanyahu lack understanding of what it's like for the Iranians? I think their calculus is far removed from such ethical considerations.
The notion of Iranian regime being “intensely religious in its motivation” is a trope - is it not just a plain fact rather than a trope? I am genuinely curious.
I think the degree and nature of the religiosity varies among members of the government (and of other governments: George W. Bush was very religious and almost certainly saw the Iraq War as God's will--same with Tony Blair, who gave Bush critical support). The question is one of explanatory and predictive value: Does the religiosity make the Iranian regime (or the American regime under Bush or any other regime) more dangerous than it otherwise would be, or make it behave in ways that rational political actors wouldn't? So far I don't see the evidence for that claim. In fact, Iran has long acted like a rational strategic actor and is acting like one right now: Any regime, secular or religious, would resist the US-Israeli regime change effort fiercely, and treat it is a literally existential threat. And the Iranian regime, in resisting this US-Israeli effort, is now playing the only strategic cards it has pretty adroitly. I'd say on balance over the past few years Israel's strategic behavior has looked more like something motivated by zealotry than Iran's has. Of course, to read mainstream American media you'd think it's the other way around. That's why I write pieces like this.
I will forever be indebted to you for your efforts to popularize cognitive empathy, which has become the central organizing principle of my own efforts in U.S.-China policy. For years, I simply called it “informed empathy” to differentiate it from the more common (but equally important) emotional empathy with which we all (mostly) come equipped. Thanks, Bob!
Kaiser, thanks for checking in here--your presence bumps our comments section up a notch on the prestige scale! And I'm delighted and flattered to hear that my ideas have been of service to you--you're definitely fighting the good fight.
"My claim [is] that more robust and widely deployed cognitive empathy could transform US foreign policy"
No, no, no. While cognitive empathy has certainly made you a perceptive and humane critic of American foreign policy, it would mainly have the effect of getting whichever policymakers adopted it fired. The goals of policy are determined by the interests of any society's dominant groups. They are not subject to change except through large changes in structure and distribution of power in that society. The overriding goal of American policy in the Middle East for 80+ years is to keep effective control of oil -- not total control, necessarily, but certainty that significant energy resources would not be controlled by states that would either use oil revenues to construct a society and economy independent of the American world system or, even worse, use them as a geopolitical weapon (just as we would do if ever challenged). I suspect most American policymakers know about the ugly history of American intervention in Iran and elsewhere and the Middle East, and it makes no difference whatever -- except perhaps tonally and tactically. Well-informed policymakers would use their deeper appreciation of history to devise more effective ways to crush their geopolitical antagonists -- because they have to. If they were to refuse, they would wind up writing an excellent, enlightened newsletter, to which no one in power would pay the slightest attention.
Yeah, I allude at the end of this piece to the fact that cognitive empathy alone isn't enough--people have to be motivated to make good use of it.
RE: ' a challenging claim to corroborate even in longer form.'. Barbara Tuchman, better known for The Guns of August about WWI, made headway in her 1998 book The March of Folly from Troy to Vietnam. She showed how arrogance and prestige, together with the inability or refusal to understand the motivations, resources, and determined will of the other side, led repeatedly to the sacrifice of lives and moral for no morally justifiable or even politcally rational ends.
Thanks--good tip. I've read (or at least listened to) The Guns of August, but not The March of Folly.
You are welcome, and thanks for running NonZero and filling a gap even the 'quality newspapers' leave open.
Thank you, Bob. Great and important column...
I read the McCrystal-French conversation. I thought the General's views were compelling and enlightening but I missed the pushback from French. Thank you for pointing that out.
I've long felt Wright has been correct about our egging on Russia to protect itself by invading Ukraine, a point Mearsheimer got a lot of flack for from the Blob. But following that analogy, Israel would be Russia in that correlation. Iran has aggressively targeted Israel through proxies as well as rhetoric for many decades, making Israel feel as cornered as Russia, if not more so. I hate the settlement atrocity that gives lie to the supposed seriousness that Israel has given the two state solution, but I can't blame Israel for wanting to defang Iran considering Iran's practically open warfare for much of Israel existance. Double standard here, Bob?
Well said! But empathy does not win elections, fear and hatred and tribalism do.
Bob, been a subscriber forever. I must say if Mickey is reachable in the midst of his "project " to must get him on to discuss Trump’s current milieu
I found this exchange both thoughtful and necessary. As a career Special Operations Forces soldier, I share the perspective General McChrystal expresses. Those of us who have spent our lives in the profession of arms are often the last people eager to see war. We understand its consequences not as abstractions but as memories - friends lost, families shattered, and the quiet weight carried by those who return home. Soldiers know that strategy requires more than strength; it requires the discipline to understand how our adversaries see the world and why conflicts begin in the first place. General McChrystal’s willingness to acknowledge the deeper historical context behind Iranian hostility reflects the kind of strategic empathy that serious military leaders must cultivate.
What struck me most in the article is that the most balanced voice in the conversation came from the man who had commanded troops in war. That is not an accident. Those who have paid the price of war tend to approach it with humility and caution. We do not romanticize it, and we do not treat it as a political talking point. Instead, we seek to understand the chain of decisions, grievances, and miscalculations that bring nations into conflict. If more of our national debate reflected the kind of perspective McChrystal demonstrated - grounded in history, strategic awareness, and empathy for how others perceive our actions - we might avoid some of the needless wars that have marked our recent history.
I expressed my own point of view on this question - when the conflict started brewing:
https://substack.com/@521036/note/p-184815933?r=2fbxd&utm_medium=ios&utm_source=notes-share-action
A great essay from Bob! I was so startled by McCrystal's informed and thoughtful view of U.S.-Iranian history and the lessons it can teach us that I didn't pay attention to French's comments as much as I should have. I forwarded French's interview to several friends, but recommended it only on the basis of McCrystal's surprising narrative. Thanks! I will share this valuable commentary also.
I am totally on board with your views on cognitive empathy. It is a shame that so many people, including some of your commenters, do not understand that cognitive empathy is way different from affective (emotional) empathy. My last post is about the different types of empathy.
No one can know exactly how another person, or group of people, feels though it is not too difficult, with a little effort, to attain a pretty good understand of what is going on in someone else's head. And this insight can be extremely useful when deciding how best to deal with this other person/group. This is true for international relations as well as dealing with a rebellious teenager. Having a good idea what an opposing leader, or a teenager, wants, as well as what pisses them off, opens up a lot more options than just trying to bludgeon them into submission.
You should invite David French on your podcast to debate his blindspots (as you lay out in your column).
Bob, it sound like you may be conflating how wars are sold to voters with how leaders arrive at the decision to go to war. Cognitive empathy (or rather lack thereof) is very relevant to the former, to how we might think about the wars our countries wage, but not so much to the latter. Leaders may well evince a lack of understanding of their adversaries, but I doubt that this is due to some kind of a ill-conceived animus or a lack of empathy. rather they may be prone to over-estimating their hand or miscalculate the enemy's response. For instance on Iraq, RAND’s review of postwar planning found that optimistic assumptions at senior levels overrode warnings about what would follow the invasion. That looks much more like misjudgment and overconfidence than like a simple empathy failure. And this time, where is the evidence that Trump and Netanyahu lack understanding of what it's like for the Iranians? I think their calculus is far removed from such ethical considerations.
The notion of Iranian regime being “intensely religious in its motivation” is a trope - is it not just a plain fact rather than a trope? I am genuinely curious.
I think the degree and nature of the religiosity varies among members of the government (and of other governments: George W. Bush was very religious and almost certainly saw the Iraq War as God's will--same with Tony Blair, who gave Bush critical support). The question is one of explanatory and predictive value: Does the religiosity make the Iranian regime (or the American regime under Bush or any other regime) more dangerous than it otherwise would be, or make it behave in ways that rational political actors wouldn't? So far I don't see the evidence for that claim. In fact, Iran has long acted like a rational strategic actor and is acting like one right now: Any regime, secular or religious, would resist the US-Israeli regime change effort fiercely, and treat it is a literally existential threat. And the Iranian regime, in resisting this US-Israeli effort, is now playing the only strategic cards it has pretty adroitly. I'd say on balance over the past few years Israel's strategic behavior has looked more like something motivated by zealotry than Iran's has. Of course, to read mainstream American media you'd think it's the other way around. That's why I write pieces like this.